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BEND, BUT DON'T BREAK:

MDP

PROPOSAL BENDS IN THE RIGHT

DIRECTION, BUT-CRACK !GOES Too FAR
Jeffrey M. Jones*

ULTI-DISCIPLINARY Practice, the partnering of lawyers and
nonlawyers in multi-task service firms, is the next evolutionary
step of modem business. The only question that remains is exactly what shape such practices will take. Multidisciplinary practice
groups (MDPs) combine the practice of law with non-legal services, enabling MDPs to offer a "one-stop shopping" approach to help meet all of
their client's professional service needs under one roof. Merging financial planning and business consulting with traditional legal services,
MDPs will allow professionals from various industries to combine forces
and offer their clients the most complete, seamless web of services possible. But despite the business efficiencies of MDPs, such a combination of
services is wrought with ethical difficulty. The Big Five accounting firms
have heretofore determined the battlegrounds for MDP formation, but
efforts by the American Bar Association may pave the road for their arrival on terms the legal profession can withstand.
In 1998, Philip S. Anderson, then President of the ABA, appointed a
special committee to explore and examine the opportunities presented
and ramifications anticipated by the diversification of the legal profession. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (the "MDP
Commission" or "Commission") thus set out to study the operation of
MDPs abroad, examine their myriad ethical hitches, and survey attorneys
and businessmen alike from around the globe. In June 1999, the Commission presented its Report' and Recommendation 2 (the "MDP Proposal" or "Proposal") that would become the ABA's platform in the
ensuing MDP debate.
* B.A., Princeton University, 1995; Candidate for J.D., SMU School of Law, May
2001. Upon graduation, the author will join the firm of Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P. in Dallas,

Texas.

1. ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report, at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdreport.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinafter MDP Report].

2. ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of Delegates, Recommendation, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinafter MDP Proposal].
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The MDP Proposal was bold and far-reaching, essentially recommending that MDPs be welcomed with open arms. According to the Proposal, MDPs in all forms shall be allowed. Lawyer-controlled MDPs shall
be self-regulated 3 and nonlawyer-controlled MDPs shall be subjected to a
professional audit.4 In addition, the Proposal eliminates the ban on feesharing, 5 stresses that nonlawyers shall not be allowed to practice law6 ,
and dictates that "[aill rules of professional conduct that apply to a law
firm should also apply to an MDP. ''7 The Proposal first and foremost
recognizes the inevitability of MDPs, and then lays out an ethical framework that allows for their formation in a manner bearable to the core
values of the legal profession.
Unfortunately for the MDP Commission and the ABA, the Proposal
has suffered two staggering blows. First, in Atlanta in August 1999
(barely two months after its release), the Proposal was tabled for further8
consideration at the annual meeting of the ABA's House of Delegates.
The Delegates, by their vote, felt it more prudent to wait "unless and
until" greater evidence surfaced to compel the need and desire for MDPs
on American soil. The Commission worked diligently to prepare a revised Proposal for the 2000 annual meeting in New York, but after a year
of salesmanship, presented a Proposal that was only slightly altered from
the Atlanta draft. The revised Proposal maintained the same basic
framework as the original offering and met with a similar fate. At the
2000 meeting in New York, the ABA House of Delegates soundly defeated the Commission's Proposal 314-106. 9
The Proposal remains the ABA platform in ongoing debates, but has
the Proposal gone too far? Is the ABA biting off too much too soon in its
approach to MDPs? This paper suggests so. The problem lies not in the
Proposal's overall message (i.e., MDPs should be allowed and subject to
legal rules of ethics), but in its approach - specifically its handling of
MDPs to be controlled by professionals outside of the legal profession.
Generally speaking, there are two forms of MDPs: those controlled by
lawyers and those controlled by nonlawyers. The Proposal allows for
both, but requires that nonlawyer-controlled MDPs be subject to a professional audit to ensure that their practices are in accord with legal tenets of ethical conduct. On a yearly basis, nonlawyer-controlled MDPs
would be required to submit "a written undertaking" to the "highest
court" in the jurisdiction, most likely the state's Supreme Court. 10 This
audit process, as is suggested by the Proposal, is the legal profession's
3. See id. at Recommendation No. 12.
4. See id. at Recommendation No. 14.
5. See id. at Recommendation No. 2.
6. See id. at Recommendation No. 4.
7. Id. at Recommendation No. 7.
8. The proposal was tabled by a vote of 304-98. See ABA Delegates Vote Not to Approve MDPs "Unless and Until" More Study Dispels Risks, 77 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1922, at 197 (Aug. 12, 1999).
9. See ABA Says No to MDPs, TEX. LAw. at 15 (July 17, 2000).
10. MDP Proposal, supra note 1, at Recommendation No. 14.
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defense against ethical compromise, and purports to solve the problem of
maintaining proper legal ethics in an entity controlled by nonlawyers.
But this approach suffers from five fatal flaws, encompassing ethical,
practical and political problems. First, nonlawyer-controlled MDPs fail to
protect the core ethical values of the legal profession. Chinese walls may
protect limited business interests, but are insufficient to protect the unconflicted client service that proper legal tenets dictate. Second, the enforcement regime suggested by the ABA proposal to regulate nonlawyercontrolled MDPs is unworkable. It is unlikely that the system could be
properly enforced and its administrative requirements place too difficult
a burden on already strained court system resources. Third, the Proposal
ignores international trends in its approach to nonlawyer-controlled
MDPs. MDPs have taken root in many foreign jurisdictions, but only
under exclusive lawyer control. Fourth, the ABA Proposal is politically
infeasible. A proposal allowing nonlawyer-controlled MDPs will always
risk passage at the hands of the ABA's House of Delegates, regardless of
built-in protections. At a time when the ABA needs to act quickly, the
Proposal in its present form threatens to reduce the American MDP debate to a standstill. Finally, the MDP Commission, authors of the MDP
Proposal, are already predisposed against nonlawyer MDPs. Their Proposal is a thinly veiled ban on nonlawyer-controlled MDPs and should
best be amended to reflect their true sentiment.
This paper will tackle the MDP question in several phases, laying out
the ethical challenges presented by MDPs, examining the ABA's Proposal, and suggesting a more tempered approach toward welcoming MDP
arrival in the United States. First, a brief synopsis of the advance of
MDPs-both abroad and in the U.S.-will be laid out. The second section will address the ethical challenges presented by MDPs, discussing the
present state of legal ethics and the pertinent provisions of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. The third section will dissect the ABA
Proposal, analyzing the changes it suggests and their possible ramifications. Finally, the last section will challenge the inclusion of nonlawyercontrolled MDPs in the Proposal and suggest a more conservative approach-the elimination of this provision altogether. The Proposal is a
step in the right direction, but may prove too aggressive for both passage
and implementation. In the words of Philip Anderson, "Market forces
cannot be stopped. But they can be channeled." 11 The ABA must ensure
that the channel chosen is both appropriate and feasible.
I.

BACKGROUND ON MDP DEVELOPMENT

Multi-Disciplinary Practices, in various forms, currently operate in numerous jurisdictions around the globe. Ranging from loosely tied referral
11. ABA MultidisciplinaryPracticeCommission Recommends Amending Rules to Allow MDPs, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 790 (June 11, 1999) (former ABA

President at a Washington news conference announcing the original release of the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice's Report and Recommendations).
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networks to fully integrated service firms, MDPs find their origin in the
growth and expansion of professional service firms throughout the late
1980s and early 1990s. As these firms, particularly the then-called "Big
Eight" accounting firms, widened their service umbrellas beyond traditional accounting practices, legal services became a natural target for
growth. 12 Venturing into legal services in foreign countries was limited
only by the ethical constructs of the target jurisdiction, and has resulted in
various forms of associations - the beginnings of MDPs.
Generally speaking, MDPs in foreign jurisdictions are tolerated rather
than officially sanctioned. But with every passing month, legal professions around the globe are coming to terms with MDPs and designing
ethical frameworks to allow for their official existence and development.
New South Wales, Australia, regarded as the most MDP-advanced international jurisdiction, has explicitly permitted MDP formation since provincial legislation passed in 1994.13 The Law Society of Upper Canada
(the legal regulatory body of Ontario) has also officially tackled MDPs,
passing rules during its 1999 meetings to allow lawyer-controlled MDPs.14
Recent legislation in Spain permits limited forms of MDPs, although not
with accountants. 15 In addition, the Council of the Law Society of England and Wales, Denmark, and the International Bar Association are
presently reviewing reports on MDPs submitted by specially appointed
steering committees and expect to make decisions by early 2001.16
But although various jurisdictions are gradually laying down rules and
regulatory directives, in many cases mere toleration is all that is necessary
for MDPs to flourish. In France, MDPs take the form of independent
captive law firms with tightly connected referral networks. French lawyers will typically own the law firm, "but they also share the same client
base as the accounting firm, work very closely with it, and benefit from
volume cost savings ... that result from leasing space in the same office
building as the accounting firm .... 17 According to the partner in charge
of Archibald Andersen Association d'Avocats' Paris office (a French law
firm associated with Arthur Andersen), "We provide all the typical ser12. It should be noted that MDPs, as a concept, are not limited to the accounting firm
paradigm. In fact, MDPs may find their greatest operational success in far smaller settings
combining rural attorneys with psychologists, social workers, lobbyists, or architects, depending on client demand. But for purposes of this paper, the focus will primarily be on
the advance of the Big Five accounting firms, whose rapid expansion in professional services has brought MDPs to the forefront of legal debate around the globe.
13. See S. Stuart Clark & Larissa Cook, MultidisciplinaryPractice: Is It the Wave of the
Future, or Only a Ripple: The View from Australia, 66 DEF. CoUNs. J. 460, 472 (1999).
14. See The Legal Profession: The Quest to Go Multidisciplinary, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, Aug. 20, 1999, at B22.
15. See John C. Evans & Eleanor Boddington, Multidisciplinary Practice: Is It the
Wave of the Future,or Only a Ripple: The View from England, 66 DEF. CouNs. J. 460, 466
(1999).
16. See id.
17. ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Developments, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicomreport0199.html, (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter MDP Background Paper].
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vices of a business law firm."'1 8 Similar "associations," operating in the
absence of regulation, exist and are developing in Ireland, Scotland, and
South Africa, to name a few - seemingly anywhere the Big Five can justify
acquiring legal services around the world. 19 Through these and other
forms of associations, licensed attorneys are presently20 employed by
nonlawyers throughout the world in staggering numbers.
MDPs in any form, of course, are presently forbidden in the United
States. Fee sharing with nonlawyers and loosely held protections for client confidences, common practices within MDPs, are explicitly prohibited by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules"),
the ethical guidelines promulgated by the ABA. 2 1 But despite their explicit ban in U.S. jurisdictions, MDP inroads have begun. Most alarmingly to MDP opponents, Ernst & Young has recently established an
association with former King & Spalding attorneys in Washington, D.C.
Using D.C.'s relaxed rules on the use of trade names (intended for lobbying firms and trade associations), Ernst & Young announced the formation of McKee Nelson Ernst & Young on November 2, 1999.22 While the
firm will formally be a separate entity, Ernst & Young financed the new
firm's launch and "they plan to market their services side by side."' 23 According to founding partner William McKee, "The reason we're doing
this is we think this is the future. '24 The deal appears to be in direct
defiance of the Model Rules, but William Lipton, Ernst & Young's Vice
Chairman, maintains that the firm's independence insulates them from
violations. "Ernst & Young won't own any part of the law firm, and there
12 5
won't be any sharing of fees or profits.
Big Five encroachment on the U.S. legal profession has not been limited to Ernst & Young. PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC") was first
18. Chris Klein, Gold Rush, Thin Stakes: U.S. Branches Face Fierce Competition From
U.K. Solicitors, Accountants, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at Al, quoted in MDP Background
Paper, supra note 17.
19. See Charles Hogan, Law Society's Protection Ban Under Pressure,SUNDAY Bus.
PosT, Feb. 21, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7280235 (regarding MDP association in Ireland
and Scotland); David Jackson, Survey-Corporate Legal Services: Long Engagement
Rather Than a Hasty Marriage, Bus. DAY May 8, 1999, at 24 (regarding MDP association
in South Africa).
20. As of October, 1999, the Big Five employment numbers: PricewaterhouseCoopers
(Landwell): 1,735 lawyers; Arthur Andersen (Andersen Legal): 1,718; KPMG (Klegal):
1,264; Ernst & Young: 954; and Deloitte Touche: 691. These figures do not include lawyers
practicing tax law exclusively within the firms' accounting or tax divisions. See Clifford
Chance World's Largest Law Firm, Big Five Close Behind, at http://www.lawmoney.com/
public/search/PreviewStory.asp?StoryNum=3165 (Oct. 14, 1999); IFLR 1000 50 Largest
Law Firms in the World, at http://lawmoney.com/homepage/news/date/tope5O.asp(1999).
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.7-1.10 (conflict of interest), R.1.6 (client confidentiality), R.5.4 (professional independence of a lawyer) (1998) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES].

22. See Siobhan Roth, Inside the Ernst & Young Deal, LEGAL TIMES.COM at http://
www.legaltimes.com/expcfm/display.cfm?id-2099, (Nov. 5, 1999).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Tom Herman, Ernst & Young Will Finance Launch of Law Firm in Special Arrangement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999 at B10.
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among the Big Five to venture into associations with law firms, aligning
with Washington, D.C.'s Miller & Chevalier in February 1997.26 Publicized as a "strategic alliance," the arrangement was designed to focus on
federal tax law27 and to offer companies "tax representation that fully
integrate[d] negotiation and litigation strategies .... "28 According to
Philip Neal, chairman of Miller & Chevalier, the alliance would
offer a
"new and all-inclusive service to corporate tax executives. ' 29
In August 1999, KPMG Peat Marwick ("KPMG") entered the fray, announcing an alliance with several firms within a nationwide network of
state and local tax lawyers. 30 The network of law firms, operating as
SALTNET since 1997, includes San Francisco's Morrison & Foerster,
Chicago's Horwood Marcus & Berk, and Tampa's Holland & Knight, all
of whom have negotiated agreements with KPMG. 31 Through the alliance, KPMG and its associated law firms will offer joint consulting services and refer clients to one another. According to Donald Griswold,
KPMG's national partner in charge of state and local tax services, their
strengths-KPMG's
in tax planning and the law firms' in litigation - will
"mesh neatly. ' 32 Says Griswold, it is "that much more valuable to the
client if we can bring those disciplines together at the start of the [consult'33
ing] process."
Arthur Andersen and Deloitte & Touche, the remaining Big Five firms,
have yet to announce U.S. associations, but remain active in aligning with
law firms abroad. Andersen Legal, Arthur Andersen's legal arm, presently has acquired over 1700 attorneys worldwide. 34 Deloitte & Touche
remains the least active among the Big Five in this area, amassing less
than 700 attorneys around the globe. 35 But judged by number of attorneys, Andersen Legal and Deloitte & Touche rank 4th and 30th, respec36
tively, as the largest law firms in the world.
In addition to establishing law firm alliances, the Big Five's foray into
the U.S. legal profession includes raiding top lawyers and recruiting from
the nation's top law schools with increasing regularity. In addition to the
King & Spalding partners, prominent tax partners from such firms as
Baker & McKenzie, Wilson Sonsini, and Pilsbury Madison & Sutro have
26. See Tom Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and
State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1997, at Al (PwC was simply Price
Waterhouse at the time of the alliance announcement).
27. See Arian Campo-Flores, Dream Tax Team, AM. LAW., Sept. 1999, at 19.
28. Herman, supra note 26 (quoting Bob Shapiro of Price Waterhouse (now PwC) in
Washington).
29. Id.
30. See Campo-Flores, supra note 27, at 18.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 18-19 (alterations in original).
34. See IFLR1O00 SO Largest Law Firms in the World, (Oct. 14, 1999), at http://
www.lawmoney.com/homepage/news/data/top50.asp.
35. See id.
36. See id.
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recently left their firms to join the Big Five. 37 Reportedly, they have
been offered "seven-figure salaries and little or no billable-hour requirements to join."'38 Ernst & Young has taken to the law school recruiting
circuit as well, visiting 14 schools in 1999 and reporting 200 expected hires
39
from their efforts.
But the diversification of professional services has not been an entirely
one-sided affair. Paralleling the alliances established by the Big Five,
many entrepreneurial law firms have developed wide-ranging associations of their own. McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe L.L.P. (Richmond,
VA) has forged a consulting group headed by former Virginia Governor
George Allen with offices in both Richmond, VA, and Washington,
D.C. 40 Bingham Dana (Boston) has established a similar consulting arm,
headed by former New Hampshire Governor Stephen Merrill, to take
advantage of "the growing intersection between law, business and government. ' 41 In addition, the firms of Howrey & Simon (Washington,
D.C.) and Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice (Winston Salem, NC) employ consulting teams of 20 or greater, and Littler Mendelson (San Francisco, CA) has formed Employment Law Training Inc., a stand-alone
42
human resources firm.
The advance of the Big Five and the diversification of the legal profession has, until recently, caught the ABA flat-footed. In 1998, in response
to mounting concern, then-ABA President Philip Anderson appointed a
commission to study and examine MDPs and to prepare a report for review at their August 1999 annual meeting in Atlanta, Georgia. The MDP
Commission assembled law professors, federal and state judges, and practicing attorneys from around the country to appraise the MDP advance
on the U.S. legal profession. Their mission was not only to study and
discuss MDPs, but to recommend a course of action for the ABA to
follow.
After ten months of interviews, debate, and discussion, the MDP Commission produced a report in June 1999 recommending the full embrace
of MDPs along with several substantial amendments to the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct to facilitate their arrival. 43 The proposal was
then presented to the ABA's policy-making House of Delegates in Atlanta, with hopes of passage and adoption. Once adopted by the ABA,
the recommended changes to the Model Rules could then be studied, debated, and possibly adopted by state bar associations. But the Proposal
met with strong opposition from several state bar associations. Ultimately, the Commission's recommendations were not subjected to a vote.
37. See Kelly A. Fox, Firms are Forging Ahead with Alliances, Despite ABA Rejection
of MDPs, 10 Law Firm Partnership & Ben. Rep. 5 (Nov. 1999).
38. Id.
39. Ernst & Young N.A.L.P. forms (1999).
40. See Fox, supra note 37.
41. Id. (quoting Jay Zimmerman, Bingham Dana's managing partner).
42. See id.
43. See MDP Report, supra note 1.
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Instead, the House of Delegates passed a motion proposed by the Florida
Bar not to change any provisions of the Model Rules "unless and until
additional study demonstrates that such changes will further the public
interest without sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and
was
the legal profession's tradition of loyalty to clients."' 44 The Proposal
45
thus tabled for further study before an official vote was taken.
The August meeting in Atlanta was the ABA's first official attempt to
grapple with MDPs and spawned heated debates throughout the country.
Many state bar associations formed exploratory committees to analyze
the issue and the MDP Commission took to revising their Proposal and
collecting further evidence to "demonstrate" both the need for and the
advantages of MDPs. After nearly a year of quasi-roadshows and slight
changes to their Proposal, the Commission presented its findings and recommendations to the House of Delegates in New York in July 2000. But
after several hours of debate, the MDP Proposal was once again turned
down, this time by a recorded vote of 314-106.
The U.S. legal profession remains in flux about MDPs. The ABA Proposal was an admirable first step, but will need to undergo fundamental
changes before it will be given future consideration by the House of Delegates. The next section will take a more exacting approach to the ethical
challenges presented by MDPs, analyzing the major areas of ethical concern and the corresponding provisions of the Model Rules.
II.

THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF MDPS

In its recommendation to the House of Delegates, the ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice defines an MDP as follows:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all,
of its purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than
the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services. It includes an arrangement by which
a law firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide
services, including legal services, and there is
46 a direct or indirect
sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.
MDPs will facilitate the combination of legal services with myriad
other professional services, allowing clients the benefits of complete professional business consultation. But merging a traditional law practice
with another professional services enterprise is an endeavor quite different from any typical business combination. Attorneys and consultants
are playing similar games, but with very different sets of rules. In today's
world of high speed and high power mergers and acquisitions, rarely a
44. ABA Delegates Vote Not to Approve MDPs "Unless and Until" More Study Dispels
Risks, 77 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1922, at 197 (Aug. 12, 1999) (quoting a
motion by the Florida Bar to postpone changes to the Model Rules until further study has
been assessed).

45. The proposal was tabled by a vote of 304-98. See id.

46. MDP Proposal, supra note 2, at Recommendation No. 3.

2001] MDP PROPOSAL BENDS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 403
second thought (if even a first) is given to ethical consequences. But in
the case of MDPs, questions of ethics transcend all others. In broad
terms, the ethical challenges presented by MDPs fall into three categories: 1) conflict of interest rules, 2) the protection of client confidences,
and 3) the independence of an attorney's professional judgment. This
section will examine these primary areas and touch on several secondary
issues. Once the ethical boundaries have been considered, the next section will analyze the MDP Commission's attempt to reconcile them and
allow for MDP formation in U.S. jurisdictions.
A.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

MDPs encounter perhaps their greatest ethical challenge in the area of
conflicts of interest. MDPs, by definition, will bring many different professions under one roof. These professions not only bring together a varied assortment of skill and expertise, but a varied assortment of ethical
rules. Different professions have different standards of conduct, and an
MDP will find its greatest ethical harmony in those areas where the gap
between standards is small. The less professions have to alter their rules,
the easier it will be for MDPs to gain acceptance within those professions.
With respect to conflicts of interests, unfortunately, the gap remains very
wide.
An attorney's advice to a client must be unencumbered and untainted
by any other interest. The attorney must at all times be guided and directed with only the best interests of the client in mind. This ethical tenet
is the bedrock of legal services. To that end, several of the Model Rules
create a framework in which conflict of interest questions must be
determined.
Rule 1.7 lays out the guiding principles of the conflict of interest rules,
establishing client loyalty as paramount in the lawyer/client relationship. 47 A decision to represent clients with "directly adverse" interests
(even in different matters) is not one for the attorney to make alone, but
must accompany client approval. 4 8 In addition, an attorney must have
client consent in order to proceed with any representation if such representation "may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own [personal]
interests. "49
Rule 1.8 governs transactions between an attorney and their client,
prohibiting or limiting such actions as entering a business deal with a client, designing wills that personally and directly benefit the attorney, and
giving certain forms of financial assistance to a client. 50 In essence, an
47. See MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Rule 1.7.
the lawyer's relationship to a client." Id. at cmt. 1.
48. MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Rule 1.7(a).

49. Id. at Rule 1.7(b).
50. See id. at Rule 1.8(a), (c), and (e).

"Loyalty is an essential element in
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attorney may not enter into a transaction that places an attorney in a
position to financially take advantage of his or her client.
Rule 1.9 extends the conflict rules, although in a somewhat tempered
fashion, to former clients. 5 1 This rule reflects the ongoing nature of the
attorney/client relationship, prohibiting an attorney from representing
any other client "in the same or a substantially related matter" if that
client's interests are "materially adverse to the interests of the former
client," without first having the former client's consent. 52 According to
the official comments, "[t]he underlying question is whether the lawyer
was so involved in the matter [with the former client] that the subsequent
representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter
'53
in question.
Finally, Rule 1.10 recognizes the fluid nature of business within a law
firm, imputing a single attorney's conflicts to all lawyers within the firm.
"While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so. . . . 54 This rule extends from the premise that "a
firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for the purposes of the rules
governing loyalty to the client."' 55 In sum, the Model Rules require attorneys to have only their client's best interests in mind throughout and following representation, untainted by conflicting interests from any other
source. If conflicting interests exist or emerge, and the client feels
threatened, the attorney must decline or withdraw from representation.
MDPs pose their greatest ethical threat in the area of conflicts. Similarities and common ground can be found between the professional ethics
of lawyers and other professions in many other potential trouble areas,
but in the case of conflicts, the legal profession is unique and unforgiving.
As detailed above, conflicts-even potential conflicts-can preclude representation in any fashion. The adversarial underpinnings of the practice
of law dictate representation unfettered by conflicting interests and lie at
the core of the profession's demanding rules. Other professional services,
on the other hand, are not characterized by explicit confrontation and
have developed rules more accommodating to developing profits than to
protecting a client's exclusive interests.
Conflict problems exist in other professions, but are simply handled
differently. While lawyers must restrict and even prohibit representation,
other professions allow "screens" and "Chinese walls." These barriers
allow consulting or accounting firms to artificially separate conflicting clients and handle both accounts simultaneously. If a conflict is identified at
the outset of representation, or arises throughout, non-legal service firms
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at Rule 1.9.
Id. at Rule 1.9(a).
Id. at Rule 1.9 cmt. 2.
MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Rule 1.10(a).
Id. at Rule 1.10 cmt. 6.
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simply erect a Chinese wall, cordon off the affected staff, and move forward with both clients.
Chinese walls are handled much more delicately in the practice of law,
and are far less common. The differences in approach to Chinese walls
(accommodating in the business model and antagonistic in the legal
model) lie in the inherent differences between the relationships of the
clients being served. In the business model, client cooperation is the standard. Terms are fought over and voices may rise throughout the process,
but the parties have assembled to enter into business together. Their interests are much more commonly aligned than in a legal setting and the
parties are thus more flexible and more willing to tolerate Chinese walls.
There is very little incentive to "rock the boat," and Chinese walls are
viewed as a simple solution to maintain the stability of negotiations and
close the deal. In this accommodating atmosphere, little thought or
worry is given to a consultant with a conflicting interest, so Chinese walls
are the accepted norm.
Clients opposite one another in a legal matter have a different outlook.
The party on the other side of the table is no longer a potential business
partner, but is an adversary with opposite interests. The practice of law,
thus, often pits parties against one another in a zero sum game. Gains for
Party A are losses for Party B, and vice versa. In such a situation, simply
throwing up a Chinese wall becomes far more suspect. An affected legal
client has much more to lose and greater reason to question the strength
and integrity of the screen. As such, Chinese walls are strictly forbidden
among current clients.
As Model Rule 1.7 dictates, client consent is required to overcome directly adverse and materially limiting conflicts. 56 Because of the reasons
discussed above, client consent is rare. In addition, Model Rule 1.10 prevents a firm from merely blocking off a tainted lawyer by surrounding
him with a Chinese wall. "While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of
them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so. . ..
The threat of undue
influence far outweighs any ease in case administration gained by using
Chinese walls. Put more bluntly, promoting unconflicted client service is
paramount to facilitating profits.
The only situation in which Chinese walls are tolerated throughout the
legal profession is with respect to former clients. 58 Attorneys frequently
change firms and often times join a firm that represents adversaries of
clients of the former firm. But if conflicts can be identified in advance of
the new attorney's arrival, a screen can be placed around him so as not to
taint his new firm. But creation of a valid Chinese wall in the legal pro"57

56. See id. at Rule 1.7.
57. Id. at Rule 1.10(a).
58. There are several provisions throughout the Model Rules that tolerate Chinese
walls for paralegals and support staff. See MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Rule 5.3 (Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants).
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fession is more difficult than it may first appear and has only recently
(even in this strict circumstance) gained acceptance.
Former client conflicts is an issue that has been handled in various ways
throughout the evolution of legal ethics. Model Rule 1.9 squarely explains the concerns involved:
There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented by the former firm must be reasonably assured
that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule
should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous
association.5 9
Legal ethics have evolved from strict prohibition surrounding former
client conflicts (similar to the method now employed with respect to concurrent conflicts) to a more relaxed rebuttable presumption standard.
One approach has been to seek per se rules of disqualification. 60 Per se
disqualification would make one grand assumption, namely, that "if a
lawyer has been a partner in one law firm and then becomes a partner in
another law firm, there may be a presumption that all confidences known
by a partner in the first firm are known to all partners in the second
firm.''61 A slightly less drastic, but equally problematic, standard was
adopted by Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility: the "appearance of impropriety" standard. 62 Under this standard,
if a new relationship merely appears to be conflicting, it is in fact conflicting, and representation must be declined. This approach suffers from
problems of ambiguity and application. Canon 9 did not define "impropriety," so finding its "appearance" was open to varying interpretation.
the
Second, the standard used the former client's perspective, leaving
63
conflict rules at the subjective judgment of former client anxiety.
Abandoning both of these approaches, the Model Rules recognize a
rebuttable presumption standard. Prior associations, under this standard,
are presumed to be prohibitively conflicting unless proved otherwise.
Accordingly, if an attorney is challenged for disqualification, he has the
burden to show that he 1) had limited access to the former client files,
and 2) has no actual knowledge of former client information. 64 Consider
three different situations. First, an attorney in Law Firm ABC had X as a
client and his new firm LMN sues X on behalf of Y. The attorney (and
his new firm) would be conflicted out because X was his direct client at
ABC, and he would clearly have actual knowledge of confidential client
information. LMN cannot erect a Chinese wall to circumvent the conflict
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

MODEL RULES,

supra note 21, Rule 1.9 cmt. 3.

See id. at Rule 1.9 cmt 4.
Id.
Id. at Rule 1.9 cmt. 5.
See id.
See id. at Rule 1.9 cmts. 7, 9.
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and must refuse Y's business. Second, X was a client of ABC, but not a
direct client of the transferring attorney. Instead, the attorney only
learned about X in partner meetings where various clients and strategies
were discussed. When he leaves for LMN and LMN sues X on behalf of
Y, he and his new firm are conflicted out. Although he may have had
limited access to X's files, he learned confidential information in the partner meetings. Again, LMN cannot erect a Chinese wall to circumvent the
conflict; the connection remains too strong and LMN must refuse Y's
business. Finally, X was a client of ABC, but the transferring attorney
never became involved in X's case and never had access to any of X's
confidential information. In this final case, the attorney's knowledge of X
is negligible. Only in this final scenario may LMN erect a Chinese wall
and proceed with the case against X.
The New York Court of Appeals, which operates under former client
conflict rules that mirror Model Rule 1.9,65 recently echoed this sentiment in Kassis v. Teacher's Insurance & Annuity Association.66 "[E]ven
where it is demonstrated that the disqualified attorney possesses no material confidential information, a firm must nonetheless erect adequate
screening measures to separate the disqualified lawyer and eliminate any
involvement by that lawyer in the representation. '67 In this case, a firstyear associate, Charles Arnold, switched sides in the midst of litigation.
Recognizing the ethical consequences of the move, Arnold's new firm
immediately instituted a Chinese wall around him. The screen was outlined in a memo from the new firm's lead counsel on the case to opposing
counsel:
1. The entire file which presently consists of 15 redwells will be kept
in my office in lieu of our general filing area.
2. Mr. Arnold's office will be at a substantial distance from my
office.
3. Mr. Arnold upon commencement of his employment... will be
instructed not to touch the Kassis file nor to discuss the Kassis matter with any partner, associate or staff member of the firm.
4. There will be no meetings, conferences or discussions in the presence of Mr. Arnold concerning the Kassis litigation.
5. All future associates who may work on the Kassis matter with me
in preparation
for trial will be instructed not to discuss this file with
68
Mr. Arnold.
The provisions taken by Arnold's new firm appear to be strongly
worded and were instituted as a precondition to Arnold's employment.
But despite its efforts, Arnold's new firm was disqualified. The court determined that Mr. Arnold's involvement in the case had been too great at
his original firm, and the Chinese wall was insufficient to prevent firmwide disqualification.
65. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 1200.24, 1200.27 (2000).

66. 717 N.E.2d 674 (N.Y. 1999).
67. Id. at 678.
68. Id. at 676.
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This exhaustive discussion of Chinese walls is designed simply to illustrate how far apart lawyers and nonlawyers are in their approach to conflicts of interest. In nonlawyer firms, Chinese walls are a necessary evil
and an accepted reality of doing business. Chinese walls divide former
clients, and Chinese walls divide concurrent clients. In law firms, on the
other hand, Chinese walls are rarely used. Screens are not even considered as a way around concurrent client conflicts, and they are used in only
the narrowest of circumstances to ease former client conflicts. Rather
than screen tainted lawyers, a firm must simply turn business away - a
difficult pill for a consultant to swallow.
The differences in approach to conflicts are also ingrained by procedure. If an opposing lawyer has a possible conflict, counsel need only file
a single-page "Motion to Disqualify." The burden, as discussed above,
then falls on the accused lawyer to defend himself. If the motion is successful, counsel has eliminated a potential problem and cost the opposing
party a substantial sum, both in money and time. In the business setting,
on the other hand, having the other party's consultant removed is a much
more difficult process. Instead of filing a simple motion, a party must file
a lawsuit. Such an action is not only expensive and time consuming, but it
risks losing the business at hand. It is far simpler to have the other party
erect a Chinese wall and move forward. Procedural constraints thus influence the formation of Chinese walls. In legal matters, there is little
incentive: they are too difficult to erect and too easy to tear down. In
pure business deals, to the contrary,69there is too much incentive: they are
easily erected and costly to attack.
Since the approaches to conflicts are so different, the formation of
MDPs begs the question: whose rules govern? The Big Five stand to take
a considerable loss if subjected to the strict conflict rules governing attorneys. But by the same token, legal clients will sacrifice one of their primary protections for fair, untainted legal representation if these rules are
softened. Bridging the conflict of interest impasse may prove to be the
greatest difficulty in MDP formation.
B.

CLIENT CONFIDENCES

A question closely related to conflict of interest is that of client confidences. Many practicing attorneys are fearful that the rise of MDPs may
weaken the protections that currently surround client information and ultimately dilute public perception of the attorney/client privilege, even for
non-MDP attorneys. A more pointed worry concerns the apparent direct
opposition of the attorney/client privilege and the public duty of auditors.
If a client has legal troubles or worries, an attorney plays the role of con69. In addition, nonlawyer professions allow parties to contract out of consultant liability. Lawyers, on the other hand, are forbidden by the Model Rules from contracting
around any form of liability. See MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Rule 1.8(h). The incentives are thus further skewed: a legal screen may be defeated and result in malpractice, but
a business screen carries no such risk.
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fidante and is bound by the attorney/client privilege to keep whatever
information he learns confidential. Auditors, on the other hand, are required by law to publicly disclose audit irregularities. An audit's purpose
is to serve the investing public, not the client.
The Model Rules address client confidentiality in several locations.
Rule 1.6 lays out the general boundaries of confidentiality, prohibiting an
attorney from revealing any "information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents."' 70 Exceptions are made only when silence may compromise honesty to a court or when revealing client information is necessary to prevent a serious crime or allow the attorney to
establish a defense in a client/attorney dispute. 71 In all other circumstances, a lawyer's legal ethics require his silence and fortify the protec72
tions surrounding a client's information.
Auditing rules, the cornerstone business of the Big Five accounting
firms, on the other hand, have an entirely different goal in mind. As an
auditor proceeds through a client's documents, irregularities are not absorbed into an "auditor's privilege." Quite to the contrary, the very purpose of conducting an audit is to discover financial irregularities. If they
exist, an auditor is required by law to reveal such irregularities to the
public.
The conflict is obvious. If an MDP offers both litigation and auditing
services to a client, what happens to harmful, incriminating information
revealed to the litigators for purposes of a trial? The attorney can simply
avoid the topic in trial, but prepare for the fallout if it is somehow discovered and attacked. His obligation and duty is one of protection and confidentiality and his knowledge of client misgivings helps prevent him and
his client from being blindsided at trial. An auditor, on the other hand,
has duties and obligations that pull in an entirely different direction. If
an audit would reveal financial problems, those problems are (by law)
bound to become public knowledge. The client's opponent in trial need
only conduct the most circumspect research to find their smoking gun and
defeat the client in trial. These duties are thus clearly in opposition to
one another and a tremendous concern of MDP opponents.
C.

INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT

A final major ethical concern about the nature and make-up of MDPs
is maintaining the independence of an attorney's professional judgment.
Many worry that partnering lawyers with nonlawyers will force lawyers to
70.

MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Rule 1.6(a).
71. See id. at Rule 3.3(b) (candor toward the tribunal); Id. at Rule 1.6(b)(1) ("to pre-

vent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm"); Id. at Rule 1.6(b)(2) ("to establish a claim or

defense on behalf of the lawyer").
72. See id. at Rulel.2, cmt. 7 (lawyer not permitted to reveal client's wrongdoing except where permitted by Rule 1.6); Id. at Rule 1.13 cmt. 3 (extending protection to inhouse attorneys); Id. at Rule 4.1(b) (requiring disclosures to third parties unless such disclosures are in conflict with Rule 1.6).
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subvert their professional judgment to the bottom-line as profit margins
supplant ethics in regard to client service. Lawrence Fox, a partner of
Philadelphia's Drinker Biddle & Reath and a staunch MDP opponent,
underscores this concern with an analogy to HMOs. "Look what happened to the doctors when they sold out. They lost all their independence. Even though they've got all these oaths to do the best for their
patients they still have to call up some high school clerk to get permission
to prescribe medicine. ' 73 Fox testified during the MDP Commission's
Washington, D.C. hearings in February 1999. Of the impending August
vote on the Commission's report, Fox commented that "[t]he best thing
that could happen would be to give [the MDP report] a swift and respect' 74
ful burial in August.
The Model Rules address the independence of an attorney's professional judgment throughout its rules. Attorneys must maintain their conviction and independent devotion to their client, regardless of their
employer or of who may be paying the client's bills. Rule 1.13 details the
rules governing in-house lawyers, a common comparison to the situation
many MDP lawyers may find themselves in. According to 1.13, an inhouse lawyer "shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest
of the organization," but the lawyer may resign if "representation will
result in violation of the rules of professional conduct. ' 75 Another common situation that tests a lawyer's independence is when payment comes
from a third party, not the client. In such a situation, the third party (the
paying party) will often attempt to influence the actions of the attorney.
But Model Rule 1.8(f) makes it clear that the client's interests, not those
76
of the third party, will guide an attorney's judgment.
Unfortunately, the clarity of these rules is not enough to placate many
existing fears. Harvard Law School Professor Bernard Wolfman also testified before the MDP Commission and echoed many of Fox's fears. "If
you have people running the show who have no training or interest in the
preservation of the values that underlie the legal system and its ethical
rules, those values are going to go by the board. ' 77 According to Sydney
Cone, of counsel to New York City's Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton,
"[e]ven if lawyers do not receive specific instructions to subordinate the
interests of a particular client to economic concerns of the nonlawyers
who run the MDP, lawyers within the MDP would be keenly alert to
'78
management's expectations and their own career opportunities.
73. Lance J. Rogers, Debate on Multidisciplinary Practice Report Continues as ABA
Delegate Vote Nears, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Reg. (BNA), No. 28, at 940 (July 16,1999) (quoting
Lawrence J. Fox).
74. Id.
75. MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Rule 1.13(b) in conjunction with Rule 1.16(a)(1).
76. See id. at Rule 1.8(f)(2). "A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing
a client from one other than the client unless... there is no interference with the lawyer's
independence of professional judgment." Id.
77. Rogers, supra note 73 (quoting Professor Wolfman).
78. Id.
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D.

OTHER ETHICAL WORRIES

While conflict of interest, client confidences, and independent professional judgment dominate the critique of and anxiety over MDPs, many
more subtle ethical concerns exist as well. First of all, how will MDPs
affect current rules governing lawyer advertising? Currently, lawyer advertising is strictly controlled by Article 7 of the Model Rules ensuring
that lawyer advertising is truthful, factually substantiated, and does not
unnecessarily take advantage of those clearly in need of legal services. 79
In addition, lawyers cannot accept any payment or other form of compensation for client referrals and all advertising must be kept on record for
possible later review.80 The Big Five, on the other hand, are free to advertise in whatever medium and under any circumstance they see fit.
Consulting and accounting firms follow the capitalism ethics of "buyer
beware" rather than any set code of business ethics to ensure that their
efforts are not misleading or unduly burdensome on vulnerable prospective clients.
Second, consulting and accounting firms operate in a market where
non-compete clauses for employees are commonplace. Before accepting
employment in such a firm or business, prospective employees must
promise (contractually) that if they ever leave the firm, they will not seek
like employment in the immediate geographical area for a specified period of time. Lawyers, on the other hand, are specifically prohibited from
limiting their practice in any way by Model Rule 5.6. According to the
Model Rules, "[a] lawyer shall not participate in offering or making a
partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer
to practice after termination of the relationship."' l Such freedoms are
guided by public policy that not only considers the attorney's professional
autonomy, but also respects the client's freedom to choose an attorney.8 2
If a lawyer's practice is unduly restricted, the public loses a portion of
their access to the justice system, a right protected by the U.S.
83
Constitution.
Finally, as was mentioned briefly during the conflict of interest discussion, attorneys cannot limit their liability for malpractice as part of their
retention agreement.8 4 This rule protects the client from unprofessional
service and offers recourse for poor or inadequate legal service. An attorney can refuse to take on a case or a client, but once representation
has begun, he must serve the client with "reasonable diligence."8 5 Consultants and accountants, on the other hand, are free to contract around
whatever they deem necessary. Limiting liability may not foster much
repeat business, but the option remains for lay businessmen to limit their
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See MODEL RULES, supra note 21, Rule 7.1.
See id. at Rule 7.2.
See id. at Rule 5.6(a).
See id. at cmt. 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See MODEL RULES, supra note 21, at Rule 1.8(h).
Id. at Rule 1.3.
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client's remedies if representation is inadequate or ineffective. Again,
the lay businessman operates under a "buyer beware" code of professional ethics, a posture that stands in direct opposition to much of the
legal code of ethics.
With these ethical questions in mind, the MDP Commission sought to
develop an ethical framework that could harmonize much (if not all) of
the differences between lawyers and other professional service providers.
Their recommendations were the culmination of ten months of interviews, debate, and discussion, and will be examined in the next section.
III.

THE MDP COMMISSION PROPOSAL

Unquestionably, MDPs pose very daunting challenges to the present
make-up of legal ethics in the United States. The MDP question has
been termed everything from "a potential 'watershed' that would mark a
sea [of] change in the way lawyers do business" 86 to "the most important
issue to ever face our profession. '87 As such, the ABA took a very determined and thoughtful approach to examining MDPs, and the MDP Commission produced a very well-reasoned and thorough report.
The MDP Commission itself brought practitioners from all comers of
the profession, a conscious effort to balance any seeded biases and ensure
an objective study. The Commission's twelve members included six practicing attorneys, two judges, three law professors, and an in-house lawyer-truly a multifaceted collection of legal minds. 88 The Commission
was appointed by ABA President Philip S. Anderson in August of 1998,
and during the next ten months heard over 60 hours of testimony from 56
witnesses. According to the Commission's report,
Testimony and/or written materials [were] presented by U.S. and foreign lawyers, consumer advocates, representatives of four of the five
largest accounting firms in the world, law professors, chairs of ABA
sections and standing committees, officers of foreign and domestic
bar associations, ethics counsel of foreign and domestic bar associations, small business clients, the American Corporate Counsel
Association and in-house counsel of international corporations. 89
86. Robert Pack, Lawyers, Nonlawyers, and the Future of the Practice of Law, THE
LAW., Sept./Oct. 1999, at 25 (quoting Roger L. Page, Deloitte & Touche partner).
87. Id. (quoting the Pennsylvania Bar Association).
88. The MDP Commission included Chairman Sherwin P. Simmons of Steel, Hector &
Davis LLP (Miami, FL); Honorable Carl 0. Bradford, Maine Superior Court (Portland,
ME); Honorable Paul L. Friedman, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Washington, D.C.); Professor Phoebe A. Haddon, Temple University School of Law (Philadelphia, PA); Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., University of Pennsylvania School of Law
(Philadelphia, PA); Roberta Reiff Katz, Netscape Communications Corp. (Mountain View,
CA); Carolyn B. Lamm, White & Case (Washington, D.C.); Robert H. Mundheim,
Shearman & Sterling (New York, NY); Steven C. Nelson, Dorsey & Whitney (Minneapolis, MN); Dean Burnele V. Powell, School of Law of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City (Kansas City, MO); Michael Traynor, Cooley Godward LLP (San Francisco, CA); and
Herbert S. Wander, Katten Muchen & Zavis (Chicago, IL). See MDP Background Paper,
supra note 16, at 12.
89. MDP Report, supra note 1.
WASH.
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The magnitude of input underscores the complexity and significance of
the MDP debate. Members of the Commission may have entered their
study with varying opinions, but they all agreed that MDPs were not going away and the American legal profession had to act quickly. Their
study revealed "an interest by clients in the option to select and use lawyers who deliver legal services as part of a multidisciplinary practice." 90

Conceding that empirical evidence of such support was as yet not available, the Commission further found that a "complementary interest exists
among many U.S. lawyers in different practice settings in having the option to form relationships with nonlawyers that include the sharing of legal fees." 91
Regardless of market forces and comments received, the Commission's
stated goal was "to protect at all times the interests of clients and the
public and the core values of the legal profession. ' 92 To that end, the
Commission developed an ethical scheme markedly similar to the existing
Model Rules. The Commission first dispensed with Model Rule 5.4's fee
sharing prohibition, designing an exception for MDPs. 93 Considering the
history and reasoning employed in enacting the fee sharing ban in addition to the public interest received, the Commission noted that "[tihe existing bans found in Model Rule 5.4 were not contained in the original
Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the ABA in 1908. ' '94 Moreover, when 5.4's predecessor was introduced twenty years later, rules
against fee-sharing were placed in admonitory language only.
"Mandatory language appeared for the first time in 1969 when the ABA
'95
adopted the [existing Model Rules].
But generally speaking, after designing the MDP fee-sharing exception
and certain transparency rules, 96 the Commission holds an MDP (under
the Proposal) to the same standards as existing law firms. Lawyers will
be bound by the same ethical rules of professional conduct 97 and
98
nonlawyers will still remain prohibited from delivering legal services.
In addition, "all clients of an MDP should be treated as the lawyer's clients for purposes of conflicts of interest and imputation in the same manner as if the MDP were a law firm and all employees, partners,
shareholders or the like were lawyers." 99 Thus, to a large degree, the
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Appendix A, (June 8, 1999) http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixa.html [hereinafter MDP Report Appendix A] (recommending subsection (e) be added to the Model Rule 5.4: "To the extent provided in Rule

5.8 [Responsibilities of a Lawyer in a Multidisciplinary Practice Firm], the provisions in
usbsections (a), (b), or (d) above [fee sharing provisions] do not apply to a lawyer in an
MDP").
94. MDP Report, supra note 1 (emphasis in original).

95. Id.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See MDP Proposal, supra note 2, at Recommendation No. 9.
See id. at Recommendation No. 5.
See id. at Recommendation No. 4.
Id. at Recommendation No. 8.
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Commission created MDPs by simply overlaying existing legal ethics.
The true meat of the MDP Commission's recommendations was thus
not in determining the ethical rules that applied to MDPs-they would
parallel existing lawyer rules. Rather, the Commission channeled the
bulk of its energy into the regulation of these rules, devising an enforcement framework to ensure that the core values of the legal profession
were protected and maintained. In a lawyer-controlled MDP, enforcement was easily crafted: they would be self-regulated. 1°° Since lawyers
would remain bound by the rules of professional conduct, existing selfregulation procedures would suffice for enforcing and maintaining proper
legal ethics. Lawyer-controlled MDPs would thus be a mere extension of
the controlling lawyers' already existing ethical duties as attorneys.
Nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, on the other hand, were the Commission's (and are the profession's) greatest worry. If an MDP is controlled
by nonlawyers, how can the profession ensure that proper legal ethical
rules are established, maintained and enforced? The Commission's answer was to develop a professional auditing procedure by which nonlawyer-controlled MDPs must submit annual certificates to a regulatory body
to ensure its compliance with legal standards. The "highest court with the
authority to regulate the legal profession in each jurisdiction" would receive annual reports from nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, signed by both
the CEO (or similar officer) and board of directors (or similar body) of
the MDP. 10 1 According to the Commission's Recommendations, a nonlawyer-controlled MDP must submit a "written undertaking" that:
(A) it will not directly or indirectly interfere with the lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of a client;
(B) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures designed to
protect a lawyer's exercise of independent professional judgment on
behalf of a client from interference by the MDP, any member of the
MDP, or any person or entity controlled by the MDP;
(C) it will establish, maintain and enforce procedures to protect a
lawyer's professional obligation to segregate client funds;
(D) the members of the MDP delivering or assisting in the delivery
of legal services will abide by the rules of professional conduct;
(E) it will respect the unique role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the legal system, a representative of clients and a public citizen having special responsibility for the administration of justice.
This undertaking should acknowledge that lawyers in an MDP have
the same special obligation to render voluntary pro bono publico legal service as lawyers practicing solo or in law firms;
(F) it will annually review the procedures established in subsection
(B) and amend them as needed to ensure their effectiveness; and
annually certify its compliance with subsections (A)-(F) and provide
a copy of the certification to each lawyer in the MDP;
100. See MDP Report, supra note 1.
101. See MDP Proposal, supra note 2, at Recommendation No. 14.
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(G) it will annually file a signed and verified copy of the certificate
described in subsection (F) with the court, along with relevant information about each lawyer who is a member of the MDP;
(H) it will permit the court to review and conduct an administrative
audit of the MDP, as each such authority deems appropriate, to determine and assure compliance with subsections (A)-(G); and
(I) it will bear the cost of the administrative audit of MDPs described in subparagraph
(H) through the payment of an annual certi10 2
fication fee.
In addition, if a nonlawyer-controlled MDP were to fail its administrative audit, it would "be subject to withdrawal of its permission to deliver
legal services or to other appropriate remedial measures ordered by the
103

court."

In essence, for nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, the Commission chose not
to alter any of the profession's core values in the slightest. Instead, it
holds MDPs (in all forms) to existing legal rules surrounding conflicts of
interest and imputation and creates a certification and audit process to
"make senior officials of the MDP sensitive to these special obligations."'10 4 In the words of one commentator, the Commission's report
and recommendations were "a resounding reaffirmation that the legal
profession is not like other commercial endeavors ....When it comes to

practicing law, a lawyer's duties to his or her client, justice, and as an
officer of the court are paramount to all other concerns ...."105
Recommendations governing client confidentiality and independent
professional judgment in MDPs also strongly mirror accepted legal standards. The Commission recommended that "no change be made to the
lawyer's obligation to protect confidential client information."'10 6 But
with respect to the confidentiality standards applicable to nonlawyers, attention by the Commission is curiously absent. Presumably, nonlawyers
will not be extended an "MDP-client" privilege. In fact, the Recommendations require that MDPs take measures to inform their clients that lawyers and nonlawyers "may have different obligations with respect to
disclosure of client information."'' 0 7 But the Report fails to address the
daunting challenge of an auditor's presence in an MDP alongside attorneys. As discussed above, these professions are diametrically opposed in
their obligations-the auditor acting to disclose and the attorney serving
as advocate. Rather than confront this issue, the Commission punts. In
Endnote 3 of its Report, the Commission notes that the SEC is currently
investigating the question and that "this issue is correctly initially discussed in those fora.' 0 8 In sum, the Commission leaves client confidenti102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at Recommendation 15.
MDP Report, supra note 1.
James Wilber, American Bar Association Stakes Out Its Position on MDPs, FED.

LAW., Oct. 1999, at 21.

106. MDP Report, supra note 1.
107. MDP Proposal, supra note 2, at Recommendation 9.
108. MDP Report, supra note 1.
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ality rules (Model Rules 1.6 and the attorney-client privilege) intact for
attorneys and reserves judgment on possible additional rules for
nonlawyers.
The maintenance of independent professional judgment remains at the
forefront of the MDP debate and was not overlooked by the Commission. Recommendation No. 6 reiterates Model Rule 5.4(c)'s requirement
of professional independence, dictating that "[a] lawyer acting in accordance with a nonlawyer supervisor's resolution of a question of professional duty should not thereby be excused from failing to observe the
rules of professional conduct."' 10 9 In fact, the Report makes specific reference to Model Rule 5.4(c), recommending that it remain unchanged in
its application to MDPs.1 10 In defense of leaving this rule intact, the
Commission makes reference to in-house and government attorneys, noting that it is common for lawyers to work under the supervision of2
nonlawyers."' "Independence has been maintained in those settings,""
and the Commission feels that proper independence will be just as easily
maintained in MDPs. As added safeguards, the Commission suggests adding language to eliminate a nonlawyer supervised attorney's Nuremberg
defense and makes reference to the aforementioned professional audit
13
process."
An additional requirement for MDPs is that of transparency. Since clients may be receiving a combination of legal and non-legal services, the
Commission's Proposal obligates lawyers in an MDP "to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client sufficiently understands that the lawyer and nonlawyer may have different obligations .... "114 In addition,
an MDP client may exclusively receive non-legal services but must understand that receipt of those services may not carry the same protections as
those extended with legal services.
A final step taken by the MDP Commission was to venture a definition
of "the practice of law." Analysis of the debate surrounding what constitutes "the practice of law" is beyond the scope of this Comment but remains an important and contentious aspect of the overall MDP
discussion. According to MDP Commission Chairman Sherwin Simmons, "It is a very elusive concept .... It would take Solomon to come
up with a definition that would accurately describe the practice of
law."'1 15 Despite acknowledged difficulties, the Commission suggested
the definition employed by the Washington, D.C. Bar, a broad definition
109. MDP Proposal, supra note 2, at Recommendation 6.
110. MDP Report, supra note 1.

111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See id. The Commission recommends that the Model Rules "clearly state that a
lawyer who is supervised by a nonlawyer may not use as a defense to a violation of the
rules of professional conduct the fact that the lawyer acted in accordance with the nonlawyer's resolution of a question of professional duty." Id.
114. MDP Proposal, supra note 2, at Recommendation 9.
115. Lance J. Rogers, Debate on Multidisciplinary Practice Report Continues as ABA
Delegate Vote Nears, 31 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, (July 16, 1999).
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that many believe throws far too wide a net.' 16 Defining the practice of
law may be a key aspect of reigning in attorneys directly employed by

accounting firms, insurance companies, and banks (currently operating
under the business parlance of "consulting" and "advising"), but for the
time being it remains a veritable black hole in the MDP debate. Of the
definition proposed by the Commission, Simmons says, "I thought we
made a decent stab at it and its out there for whatever use people want to

make of

'
it. 117

While the Commission addressed the essential items for laying the ethical groundwork for MDPs, several issues remain on the table. In addition
to the difficult question of an auditor's place in MDPs (if there is one at
all), the Commission failed to address who an attorney can partner with
and what constitutes "control" of an MDP. As the Recommendations
stand, no effort has been made to restrict nonlawyer partner membership
in MDPs-all nonlawyer partners are simply "nonlawyers. '' u 8 Such a
wide-open definition has given MDP opponents great rhetorical leverage
throughout the debate. Critics point out, perhaps in hyperbole, the possible ramifications of an open definition:
Wal-Mart is committed to maximizing profits, . . . [b]ut they
shouldn't be able to own a law firm ....
Wal-Mart could form a
subsidiary called "Wal-Mart Law and Estate Planning." Or funeral
parlors could offer embalming and estate administration. A service
is a service. How about "Joe's Wrecking and Towing Service and
Personal Injury Representation." Those are all services, right?" 9
A possible option could be to restrict "nonlawyers" to other professions that require some form of certification and adherence to ethical
116. Based on Rule 49 of the District of Columbia Court Rules, the Commission notes
that the "'Practice of Law' means the provision of professional legal advice or services
where there is a client relationship of trust or reliance. One is presumed to be practicing
law when engaging in any of the following conduct on behalf of another:
a) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages, assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other instruments intended to affect interests in real or personal property, wills, codicils,
instruments intended to affect the disposition of property of decedents' estates, documents relating to business and corporate transactions, other instruments intended to affect or secure legal rights, and contracts except
routine agreements incidental to a regular course of business;
b) Preparing or expressing legal opinions;
c) Appearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal;
d) Preparing any claims, demands, or pleadings of any kind, or any written
documents containing legal argument or interpretation of law, for filing in
any court, administrative agency or other tribunal;
e) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities described in
subparagraph (a) through (d) might be done, or whether they were done, in
accordance with applicable law;
f) Furnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons, to render the services described in subparagraphs (a) through (e) above."
MDP Report Appendix A, supra note 93.
117. Rogers, supra note 115.
118. See MDP Proposal, supra note 2, at Recommendation No. 3 (defining an MDP to
include "lawyers and nonlawyers").
119. Rogers, supra note 115.
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professional standards. Defense for this position lies in the assumption
that other "certified professionals" may be able to better appreciate a
lawyer's ethical standards and would pose less of a threat to their violation than lay partners with no formal ethical training. But critics are
quick to point out the difference between, for example, a certified public
accountant and a certified beautician-simply being "certified" means
different things to different professions. In addition, many likely MDP
nonlawyer partners may include social workers, economists and lobbyists,
professions that require no official certification.
Secondly, despite basing its entire MDP ethical enforcement regime on
a distinction between MDPs controlled by lawyers and those controlled
by nonlawyers, the MDP Commission Report also fails to address what
constitutes "control" of an MDP. Presumably, the distinction would lie in
a simple majority control (more lawyers than nonlawyers, or vice versa),
but a more stringent requirement is also feasible. If lawyer-controlled
MDPs required a supermajority of 2/3 or 3/4 lawyer membership, the
MDP debate would take on a decidedly different flavor. Also, if "lawyercontrolled" simply meant that the CEO or managing partner of an MDP
were an attorney or that some smaller unit within MDP management (a
board of directors, for example) were controlled by a simple majority of
lawyers, then a "lawyer-controlled" MDP could in fact have less than a
120
majority of overall lawyer-partners.
The MDP Commission's Report and Recommendations officially
touched off the American MDP debate. While great speculation and
rhetoric was evident before the MDP Proposal, its publication has begun
the MDP discussion in earnest. Ground rules have been laid, and a viable
vision of U.S. MDPs has been set forth. But much work remains before
any tangible resolution of the MDP question is found. The next section
will critique the MDP Commission Proposal and is divided into two major portions. First, the underlying theme of the Proposal-the acceptance
of MDPs-is sound, and will be defended. But the approach taken by the
Commission-namely, the inclusion of nonlawyer-controlled MDPs-remains inherently flawed. The second portion will critique the Commission's approach, suggesting that nonlawyer-controlled MDPs be avoided
and thus should be removed from the Proposal's consideration
altogether.
IV. DEFENSE OF LAWYER-CONTROLLED MDPS
If one thing remains certain throughout the MDP debate, the likelihood of some form of multidisciplinary practice in the United States is
real and will only grow with time. The longer the American legal profession chooses to ignore nonlawyer encroachment upon legal services, the
120. The Report also neglected questions of interstate and cross-border practice, but
these issues, while important, are largely tangential to the core MDP debate. The Commission recognized the importance of these issues, but determined the MDP Report an inappropriate forum to discuss them in detail. See MDP Report, supra note 1.
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weaker its ability becomes to influence the direction of its growth and
development. MDPs have arrived, but are in their infancy. It is the profession's duty and moral obligation to grab the reins and prevent MDPs
from evolving in a manner that challenges the core values of the profession and sacrifices client service to profit development. Nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, for reasons discussed below, are an unnecessary step to
effectively influence the MDP debate. Lawyer-controlled MDPs, on the
other hand, will help American attorneys better serve their clients and
allow law firms to respond to nonlawyer encroachment into the legal
market without sacrificing legal ethics in the process.
It should be recognized, first and foremost, that MDPs will help law
firms better serve their clients. As business has become more complicated and interconnected, clients' needs have evolved as well. A client
may initially come to an attorney with a legal problem, but have in their
mind the necessity to later visit other professionals for related, but nonlegal, problems. Allowing law firms to include non-legal professionals
within their partnerships will prevent their clients from having to take this
extra step (or steps, depending on the problem) and visit several different
professionals in having their problems resolved.
Estate planning is a fantastic example. If an elderly client decides to
make alterations in his will, a lawyer is clearly needed. But in order to
fully satisfy his professional needs, the client may also require advice
from a financial planner, an accountant and a philanthropist. An MDP
would allow the firm to extend these services to its client without sending
him elsewhere. The client thus only has to explain his situation to one
group of professionals, pay one fee to professionals, and will likely have
his needs addressed in a much more timely fashion. The MDP format
would allow this firm to provide more complete and effectively delivered
services to its client. 12 1 Preventing lawyer-controlled MDPs thus "not
only bars lawyers from fresh-and lucrative-new sources of revenue, it
22
also victimizes consumers.'
Bringing various professionals under one roof not only eliminates duplication of effort on the client's part, but allows the law firm to provide
services in a more cost-effective manner. Many firms would presently
offer the services described above to any client that required them, but
would do so on a contract basis-Model Rule 5.4 requires it. With the
abolition of fee-sharing rules for MDPs, firms can now pay non-legal professionals in a manner more directly tied to their service. Instead of receiving a flat rate, perhaps inadequately tied to the value of their service,
non-legal professionals would be able to receive a portion of the profits
garnered from clients, a much more accurate and cost-effective method of
compensation. The money saved could then be passed along to the client
in the form of lower overall fees. MDPs would thus allow law firms to
121. See James Lafferty, Time to Change Rules To Allow for One-Stop Law Firms,
Dec. 6, 1999, at 25 (outlining the estate planning scenario).
122. Id.

HOUSTON CHRON.,
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deliver services in a more cost-effective manner, helping to reduce the
overall price of their services.
Lower fees and more complete service will not only help law firms better serve their clients, but will allow them greater flexibility in competing
with other professional service firms for business. As law firms diversify
their services, they can more effectively tap into previously unexplored
markets. Real estate advice need not end with contracts for sale and
lease agreements, but could extend to the planning, site-development,
and building stages as well with a qualified environmentalist, surveyor,
and architect on staff. Lawyer-controlled MDPs could also revolutionize
corporate deals, reducing the number of players significantly and consolidating fees in one service provider. Service to corporate clients need not
end with due diligence and negotiation, but could include the numerical
analysis and valuation analysis previously performed by accounting firms
and bankers. With regard to corporate deals especially, "[t]he law firm
that can ... play an integral role in as many facets of a transaction as
possible without passing it on to a potential competitor, is at a distinct
advantage."'1 2 3 The options are limited only by a firm's imagination.
Forming an MDP will not only help law firms compete for business, but
will help them retain lawyers contemplating a leap out of the practice of
law and improve recruiting for new talent. As professional service firms,
particularly the Big Five, have encroached into legal services, they have
enlisted the service of more and more attorneys. Lawyers are drawn by
factors ranging from larger salaries, a more diversified slate of work, and
(in the case of the Big Five) the opportunity to work for a firm with a
worldwide reputation. By diversifying their services, law firms can raise
overall revenues and widen their book of work and influence. All of
these factors, precipitated by the development of lawyer-controlled
MDPs, will help law firms begin to reverse the tide of lawyer defection
and ensure continued success in the recruitment of law students.
The MDP format will also enable law firms to properly reward key
nonlawyer professionals currently under contract or employed as nonpartners. Under Model Rule 5.4, fee-sharing is prohibited between lawyers and nonlawyers, regardless of the nonlawyer's contributions to the
firm's business. 12 4 But in many instances, law firms could better encourage, promote, and ultimately retain important nonlawyer staff if they
could offer them not only a higher salary but a share in the profits. Lobbying is an excellent example. While the majority of lobbyists are also
attorneys, many are not. Becoming a registered lobbyist does not require
a law degree, and many lobbyists easily master their field without one.
Lobbyists also, by definition, thrive on connections to politicians and business leaders and can be tremendous assets for a law firm, both for reputation and business. An MDP platform would allow law firms to open
123. E. Leigh Dance, How To Compete with MDPs, 13 No. 7 MKT.
1999).

124. See

MODEL RULES,

supra note 21, Rule 5.4(a), (b), and (d).

FOR LAW.

3 (Nov.
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their partnerships to valued nonlawyers such as lobbyists, properly compensating them for their contributions to the firm and ensuring their continued service.
All of the advantages mentioned above are true of any MDP form, but
lawyer-controlled MDPs also ensure a seamless transition without threatening legal ethics. Governance and management by lawyers will properly
safeguard MDPs from the ethical challenges presented by multi-faceted
representation, overseeing client development and service. Conflict of interest rules, including imputation, will continue to be respected and an
attorney's professional judgment will not require any subordination to
nonlawyer input. In addition, with appropriate safeguards for transparency, clients can be serviced, certain that their business will be held in
strict confidence.
In short, lawyer-controlled MDPs offer the benefits of one-stop shopping without endangering the legal profession's core values. Under this
format, law firms can improve their services to clients and offer them in a
more cost-effective and affordable manner. Law firms, through the MDP
platform, can also increase their competitiveness for both business and
talented lawyers as well as more properly reward key nonlawyer employees. Most importantly, with lawyers controlling, overseeing, and being
held responsible for the operations of the firm, ethical worries are of no
greater consequence than they are within any present day law firm.
The advantages of MDPs, both to clients and to the increased competitiveness of law firms, are undeniable. The MDP Commission recognized
these benefits and boldly recommended the full acceptance of MDPs in
the United States. But in its efforts to fully control MDP expansion, the
Commission also recommended the integration of MDPs controlled by
nonlawyers. The next section will examine the difficulties presented by
nonlawyer-controlled MDPs and explain why the Commission's ambitious reach may cost the American public and legal profession acceptance
of MDPs in any form whatsoever.
V. REJECTION OF NONLAWYER-CONTROLLED MDPS
As described above, MDPs are the next step in the evolution of modern business practices in the United States. Having already touched jurisdictions around the world in various forms, MDPs are a vehicle by which
the American legal profession can better serve existing clients and reach
out to new unexplored areas of client and business development. But in
extending its report and recommendations to cover nonlawyer-controlled
MDPs, as evidenced by the vote in New York, the ABA's MDP Commission may lose the MDP discussion entirely.
Nonlawyer-controlled MDPs are an unnecessary step for the ABA to
take for five reasons. First, nonlawyer-controlled MDPs will sacrifice the
core values of the legal profession. It has been shown how difficult Chinese walls are to maintain in a legal setting, and recent cases and inquiries
have exposed the weaknesses of such supposed safeguards in the business
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setting as well. Second, even if informational screens are accepted as a
viable safeguard for legal ethics, the administrative program suggested by
the MDP Commission is wholly unworkable. The present state of the
UPL debate demonstrates the difficulty of enforcing ethical violations,
and the professional audit format would simply place too great a burden
on the high courts of American jurisdictions. Third, despite the widely
touted prevalence of MDPs around the globe, nonlawyer-controlled
MDPs, with or without safeguards, are surprisingly rare. Lawyer-controlled MDPs dominate the world MDP scene, and strong opposition has
been expressed in every single jurisdiction that has thoughtfully examined
the make-up and effects of nonlawyer-controlled MDPs. Fourth, an
ABA Proposal that includes nonlawyer-controlled MDPs within its recommendations will continue to fail, time and time again, upon its submission to the House of Delegates. Including a nonlawyer-controlled MDP
provision will thus not only result in the rejection of the nonlawyer-format, but will also prevent the American legal profession from capitalizing
on the recognized benefits of MDPs controlled by lawyers. Finally, a rejection of nonlawyer-controlled MDPs is already in line with the general
sentiment of the MDP Commission. The across-the-board application of
uncompromised legal ethics to MDPs in the U.S. as well as the difficult
professional audit requirements placed on nonlawyer-controlled MDPs
show that the Commission appreciated the difficulties presented by nonlawyer-controlled MDPs and did everything in its power to prevent their
existence.
A.

ETHICAL PROBLEMS

Too

DIFFICULT TO HARMONIZE

The primary ethical difficulty of nonlawyer-controlled MDPs lies not in
protecting client confidences or maintaining the independence of an attorney's professional judgment, but in respecting and properly handling
conflicts of interest. Alerting clients to the various duties or non-duties of
professionals within an MDP team could adequately protect disclosure of
confidential information. Through transparency, if clients are made
aware that information revealed to a nonlawyer would not carry the same
privileges as with attorneys, MDPs would not forfeit their client's rights
to confidentiality and would not entice clients to unwittingly reveal information in an unprotected format. Confidentiality problems (assuming
proper resolution of the auditor question) are thus reduced to difficulties
of client understanding and transparency.
Independent professional judgment, within the MDP discussion, is also
a paper tiger. Responsibility for professional judgment ultimately resides
solely in the attorney providing counsel. MDPs may indeed present
greater temptations for its attorneys than law firms, but these temptations
are no greater than those presently borne by in-house and bank trust attorneys. If proper independence is viable in these circumstances, MDPs
are simply an extension of existing forms of nonlawyer supervision and
not a new creature of ethical crisis.
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The truly difficult question resides in protecting clients from conflicting
interests. The gap between the ethical approaches employed within the
legal profession and those taken by nonlawyer professional firms remains, at present, unbridgeable. Attorneys protect client interests with
utmost care, employing Chinese walls in only the most innocent of cases.
When conflicts arise, attorneys are duty bound to decline representation.
Nonlawyer professional service firms, on the other hand, erect Chinese
walls to resolve even the most adverse of conflicts. A recent case from
the United Kingdom, Bolkiah v. KPMG 2 5 , demonstrates the lengths to
which accounting firms will go to keep from turning business away.
KPMG has acted as auditors for the Brunei Investment Agency (BEI),
an entity formed to hold and manage the General Reserve Fund of the
government of Brunei, since its creation in 1983.126 Prince Jefri Bolkiah
served as BEI's chairman until he had a dispute with his brother, the
Sultan of Brunei, in March 1998.127 KPMG had also conducted a detailed
investigation for Prince Jefri surrounding a litigation the Prince was involved in between 1996 and 1998.128 After the Prince's departure from
BEI, the Sultan asked KPMG to conduct an investigation of the Prince's
holdings in an effort to remove his assets from BEI. KPMG, despite the
recognized conflict of interest of investigating a former client (the
Prince), threw up a Chinese wall and proceeded forward. 129 In sum,
KPMG's forensic accounting department conducted a detailed investigation for the Prince in support of a two year litigation, and then turned
around (within one month of completing that investigation) and launched
an investigation against the Prince for BEI. Needless to say, Prince Jefri
filed for an injunction to halt the investigation.
Prince Jefri's motion for injunction was ultimately granted in a unanimous decision by the House of Lords. Lord Millet, although recognizing
30
the prevalence of Chinese walls within the financial services industry,
deemed the screen erected by KPMG ineffective. According to Lord
Millet:
When the number of personnel involved is taken into account, together with the fact that the teams engaged on Project Lucy and Project Gemma [KPMG code names for the two investigations] each
had a rotating membership, involving far more personnel than were
working on the project at any one time, so that individuals may have
joined from and returned to other projects, the difficulty of enforcing
confidentiality3 or preventing the unwitting disclosure of information
is very great.' '
125. 2 App. Cas. 222 (1999).
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. (noting that "Chinese walls are widely used by financial institutions in the
City of London and elsewhere. They are the favoured technique for managing the conflicts
of interest which arise when financial business is carried on by a conglomerate").
131. 2 App. Cas. 222 (1999).
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Lord Millet also noted the difference between screens separating distinct departments and those erected within a single department "between
members all of whom . . .have been accustomed to work with each
132
other."
Chinese walls are common practice within nonlawyer professional service firms, a fact that KPMG acknowledged in Bolkiah. In fact, KPMG
insisted that "the erection and operation of information barriers... [are]
part of the professional culture in which staff work and becomes second
nature to them. ' 133 For attorneys, on the other hand, the erection of Chinese walls is far from "second nature." Quite to the contrary, informational screens and Chinese walls are highly suspect and allowed in only
the rarest of circumstances. In the words of Lord Millet (discussing the
unique duties of the legal profession):
It is in any case difficult to discern any justification in principle for a
rule which exposes a former client without his consent to any avoidable risk, however slight, that information which he has imparted in
confidence in the course of a fiduciary relationship may come into
the possession of a third party and be used to his disadvantage.... It
is of the highest importance to the administration of justice that a
solicitor.., should not act in any way that might appear to put that
information at risk
of coming into the hands of someone with an
1 34
adverse interest.
If the American legal profession is to continue to protect client interests with its present level of integrity, Chinese walls cannot become "second nature." Unconflicted client service is, and should remain,
paramount to business development. Unfortunately for nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, nonlawyer professionals do not appear prepared to adhere
to the strict conflict of interest and imputation rules that presently govern
the provision of legal services. To the contrary, as Bolkiah illustrates,
they seem ready to risk client interests whenever the opportunity
presents itself. Unless and until these variant approaches to conflicts of
interest are fully harmonized, nonlawyer-controlled MDPs are ethically
impossible.
B.

ETHICAL AUDIT SYSTEM UNWORKABLE

Assuming nonlawyer-controlled MDPs can overcome these vast ethical
differences, questions next turn to the MDP Commission's proposed enforcement regime. The Commission recognized the threat presented by
nonlawyer-controlled MDPs and designed an administrative audit system
to try to keep them ethically in check. In theory, this system will ensure
that nonlawyer-controlled MDPs respect, maintain, and enforce the ethical tenets of the legal profession, but in practice, the system suffers from
two fatal flaws. First, if the present state of the UPL debate is any indica132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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tion, there is little evidence that this regime will in fact be enforced. Second, assuming the impetus is found to enforce this system, the judicial
resources demanded may prove too burdensome to maintain.
The Commission's proposed enforcement regime requires nonlawyercontrolled MDPs to submit a "written undertaking" to the "highest
court" in each jurisdiction in which they operate, pledging its support of
and conformity with the legal rules of professional conduct. 135 Within
this document, the MDP must promise to "establish, maintain and enforce" procedures to maintain proper legal ethics, review these procedures annually, and amend them "as needed to ensure their
effectiveness."'1 36 In addition, it must annually certify compliance with
these established procedures and provide a copy of the certification to
each lawyer in the MDP. 137 A copy of this annual certificate must also be
filed with the court "along with relevant information about each lawyer
who is a member of the MDP."'1 38 Finally, the MDP must also allow the
court to conduct an "administrative audit ...
13 9

to determine and assure

compliance."
It is difficult to predict how vigorously these regulations may be enforced, but the present state of the UPL debate provides a functional
comparison. Many practicing attorneys are distraught over the high numbers of attorneys that have joined the ranks of nonlawyer professional
service firms, particularly the Big Five. In their estimation, the services
provided by many of these attorneys, while guised in the business parlance of "consulting" and "advising," are in fact the practice of law. As
such, a movement is afoot to rein these non-practicing attorneys back
under the rules of professional conduct through unauthorized practice of
law suits. According to Lawrence Fox, lawyers practicing in accounting
firms "are engaged in civil disobedience" by violating the Model Rules
0
against fee-sharing, conflict of interest, and confidentiality.1 4
The ABA has a long history of opposition to such practice, but very
little in the way of enforcement to show for it. In 1961, through ABA
Formal Ruling 297, the ABA cautioned against the practice of law in accounting firms, ruling that a lawyer employed by an accounting firm may
not advise the firm's clients about their legal problems or engage in any
related activity.1 41 But despite this 39-year-old ruling and a recent resurgence of ethical motivation, very few UPL investigations have in fact
been launched against the Big Five and none have gone to trial. In 1997,
the UPL Committee of the Supreme Court of Texas filed a complaint
against Arthur Andersen, but after an 11 month investigation, the case
135. MDP Proposal, supra note 2, at Recommendation 14.
136. Id. at Recommendation 14(B) and (F).
137. See id. at Recommendation 14(F).
138. Id. at Recommendation 14(G).
139. Id. at Recommendation 14(H).
140. ABA Delegates Vote Not to Approve MDPs "Unless and Until" More Study Dispels
Risks, 77 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1922, at 197 (Aug. 12, 1999).
141. See ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 297 (1961).
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was dismissed at the close of a one-day hearing. 142 Similar investigations
have recently begun in Virginia (against Ernst & Young) and North Caro'143
lina (against several Big Five firms), but "these are sporadic events.
The Maryland Bar Association reported 41 UPL complaints filed in 1998,
but none were related to the Big Five or involved allegations connected
to multidisciplinary practice.'"
Aside from these scant cases, UPL statutes, while on the books in
every U.S. jurisdiction, are simply not being enforced against the Big
Five. The services provided by their attorneys have been questionable at
best for nearly 40 years, yet have gone virtually unchallenged. And despite the renewed ethical awareness that has come with the MDP debate,
there is no evidence that any greater motivation will be found to actively
enforce the compliance regime suggested by the MDP Commission.
But even if the proper motivation were marshaled, where will reformers find the proper resources to fight these battles? In the Texas suit
mentioned above, according to the attorney that drafted the complaint,
the reason for dropping the case "wasn't lack of evidence but lack of
resources. ' 145 Arthur Andersen "simply overwhelmed the bar with a
phalanx of defense lawyers. '146 The Texas UPL Committee operates on
a yearly budget of $40,000, and after a certain point, their litigation simply ran out of steam. 147 The Commission's compliance regime includes a
fee provision to help pay for enforcement efforts, but it is difficult to imagine a filing fee sufficient to fund and allay the costs of MDP enforcement. Lawyer-controlled MDPs, according to the Commission, will be
self-regulated, but nonlawyer-controlled MDPs require a near herculean
marshaling of motivation and resources to properly regulate.
The over burdensome nature of the enforcement regime is the primary
complaint of MDP Commission critics. From consumer groups to accounting firms, the proposed regulations are viewed as both far-fetched
and excessive. 148 The Commission's Proposal is guided by precisely the
right principle, but has fostered entirely the wrong approach. Nonlawyercontrolled MDPs require greater regulation because they pose a significantly greater threat to legal ethics. But rather than develop an elaborate
professional auditing system to anchor them to the rules of legal profes142. See Krysten Crawford, The Enemy Has Landed, and They Count Beans, THE AM.
LAW.

Dec. 1998, at 4.

143. M. Peter Moser, The Argument For Change, 9 EXPERIENCE 4, 38 (1999).
144. See id.
145. Crawford, supra note 142.
146. Id.
147. See testimony of Brent Clifton, Chairman of the Texas Unauthorized Practice of
Law Task Force, meeting of the Dallas Bar Association (Jan. 19, 2000).
148. See Margaret A. Jacobs, ABA Puts Off Vote on Nonlawyer Partnerships,WALL ST.
J., Aug. 11, 1999, at B9 (noting that consumer groups have "criticized the ABA proposal
for excessively regulating" MDPs); Randy Myers, Lawyers and CPAs: How the Landscape
is Changing, J. OF Acc., Feb. 2000, at 75 (noting critique from the AICPA of "an ABA
plan to require MDPs controlled by nonlawyers to submit to annual certification and audit
requirements by the courts").
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sional conduct, the Commission should abandon nonlawyer-controlled
MDPs altogether.
C.

NONLAWYER-CONTROLLED

MDPs

REJECTED AROUND

THE WORLD

The more one studies and reads about the MDP debate, the more one
gets the impression that the United States is terribly behind the times.
According to news reports, MDPs have spread around the world with
lightning speed, and the ABA has simply been slow to react. But while it
is true that Europe, Australia, Canada, and areas of Asia, Africa, and
South America all have an MDP presence to some degree, the conventional news story or tantalizing front page article often fails to qualify the
MDPs it describes. MDPs exist in varying forms the world over, but the
resounding trend is to reject the nonlawyer-control format and allow
MDP formation in only a limited, lawyer-controlled fashion. The MDP
Commission is thus treading in truly unchartered waters.
With respect to the MDP debate, the nations of the world fall into one
of three categories: 1) those that have addressed MDPs, 2) those that are
studying MDPs, but have yet to formulate an official position (the United
States, for example), and 3) those that have yet to face MDPs at all. Different jurisdictions, because of their varied judicial systems, have developed a wide range of answers to the MDP question, but very few have
taken the bold step to uniformly allow their existence absent lawyer
control.
New South Wales, the southeastern Australian province that includes
Sydney and the majority of Australian business (legal and otherwise), is
the setting for perhaps the most far-reaching MDP developments in the
world. 149 A 1994 amendment to the Legal Profession Act of 1987 formally sanctioned and allowed for the formation of MDPs. But even in
1994, when the global expansion of the Big Five was in its relative infancy
(particularly with regard to expansion into legal services), New South
Wales recognized the dangers of allowing MDPs to be controlled by
nonlawyers. The 1994 amendment permits MDP formation, but "still
provides that the solicitor members of any MDP must have control of the
legal practice and majority voting rights in the MDP's affairs.' 150 As a
practical consequence, encroachment by the Big Five has come in the
form of establishing separate law firms or affiliating with existing firms
rather than setting up fully-integrated MDPs. 15 1 In fact, as of July 1998,
there were only 11 Australian MDPs formed under the 1994 legislation,
149. See Clark & Cook, supra note 13, at 472.
150. Id.

151. Three of the Big Five have ventured into the Australian legal market with standalone law firms. Andersen Legal was established as a separate law firm at the end of 1994
and then "merged with a small- to medium-sized Sydney firm ... in February 1995." Id. at
473. KPMG and Ernst & Young have also established Australian legal arms, but with a
smaller presence. See id. at 474.
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none of which included any of the Big Five accounting firms. 152
France is also cited as a legal foothold for the Big Five, but such farreaching credit can be very misleading. The emerging MDP format in
France is one of close association between the Big Five and law firms, but
falls far short of complete integration. In fact, despite allowing a more
direct association between lawyers and accounting firms in July 1998, the
Paris Bar "stopped short of full partnership with nonlawyers-that is,
lawyers must swear an oath that they are properly independent from their
accounting arm."1 53 Such opposition
to MDP formation has been echoed
15 4
by the French Bar Association.
Debate is ongoing throughout the rest of the world, but many significant legal bodies have formally stated their opposition to MDPs. The
Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union (a coalition of seven European legal governing bodies) voted to ban MDPs entirely in early January of 2000.155 The United Kingdom has endorsed

fully integrated MDPs, but has taken great lengths to explain that such
integration would be extended only to solicitors and require practicing
barristers to remain independent. In Canada, the debate remains divided. The Canadian Bar Association has endorsed a position similar to
that of the ABA's MDP Commission, but the Law Society of Upper Canada (the legal governing body for Ontario) has encouraged its attorneys
to associate only with MDPs that are lawyer-controlled.
In sum, foreign jurisdictions are far from embracing the nonlawyercontrolled format for MDPs and in many instances have specifically designed systems to prohibit their formation and development. The ABA,
in endorsing such a position, would thus be the first major professional
legal body to adopt and advance MDPs under nonlawyer supervision.
The debate abroad is far more advanced than that in the United States
and, despite the various idiosyncracies of foreign legal systems, it serves
as a firm warning against nonlawyer-controlled MDPs in America as well.
D.

NONLAWYER-CONTROLLED

MDPs

POLITICALLY INFEASIBLE

Regardless of the countervailing international trends against nonlawyer-controlled MDPs, the MDP Commission must first face the political
realities of its Proposal here in America. MDPs will fundamentally alter
the practice of law, and should not be welcomed carte blanche without
thoughtful discussion and debate. The Commission has worked tirelessly
to analyze this issue, but the depths of this study have yet to percolate
into the mainstream of the profession. But while serious and lengthy debate is necessary, it is also well-recognized that time is of the essence and
that the ABA is gradually losing its ability to shape and influence the
MDP debate with every passing day. The further the Big Five encroach,
152. See id. at 475.

153. Evans & Boddington, supra note 15, at 464.
154. See Michelin Man Joins Archibald Andersen, THE LAW., Feb. 21, 2000.
155. See Abigail Townsend, Defiance or Alliance?, THE LAW., Jan. 10, 2000, at 16.
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the greater the urgency for the American legal profession to respond.
The political climate has yet to ripen in favor of nonlawyer-controlled
MDPs, and a proposal promoting their formation will continue to fail.
The MDP Commission should amend its proposal and renew the debate
promoting only lawyer-controlled MDPs, a fundamental compromise that
enjoys broad support and will help the profession counter the advancement of the Big Five.
The American MDP debate began in earnest with the release of the
MDP Commission's Proposal in June 1999. Since that time, attorneys
around the country have been forced to address this growing concern and
have struggled to fashion a response. As has been discussed, this is a
complicated debate that is wrought with ethical difficulty. It represents
fundamental changes in the way in which American attorneys practice
law and has met with strong resistance from many different sectors of the
profession. But as the debate has grown, so has understanding-understanding of the advantages of some form of combined professional practice and understanding of the consequences for failing to respond to
current market trends.
The ABA's first opportunity to collectively express its feelings about
MDPs occurred with the August 1999 vote on the MDP Commission Proposal. The Proposal promoted MDP formation in all forms and was tabled by a vote of 304-98.156 Rather than vote directly on the Proposal,
the House of Delegates opted to postpone any such vote "unless and until" adequate empirical research demonstrated that public demand for
MDPs actually exists. The Commission continued to work, criss-crossing
the nation from town halls to weekend seminars, all the while stressing
the advantages of MDPs and the insight of their Proposal. But while the
opportunity existed to fundamentally amend and revise their Proposal,
the Commission only altered its approach on the fringes. The Proposal
presented in New York far too closely resembled the Atlanta version, and
was soundly defeated 314-106.
The next question to be asked, is to what degree has the debate advanced since the July 2000 vote? If sufficient debate has placated all existing fears, then the profession is ready for MDPs in any form. But if
sufficient doubt remains, the Proposal in its existing form risks continued
defeat.
This paper suggests the latter. Debate has been ongoing throughout
many U.S. jurisdictions since the August 1999 vote and several bar associations have reached decisions and promoted various proposals. The
resounding message, which should be heeded by the MDP Commission,
is that nonlawyer-controlled MDPs remain too difficult ethically to be
accepted and that lawyer-controlled MDPs are the furthest the House of
Delegates may be willing to indulge.
156. See ABA Delegates Vote Note to Approve MDPs "Unless and Until" More Study
Dispels Risks, 77 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1922, at 197 (Aug. 12, 1999).
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The MDP Commission must recognize the political realities facing their
Proposal. A platform that continues to endorse nonlawyer-controlled
MDPs, regardless of any supposed protections, will surely fail. If any progress is to be made, the Proposal must be amended to remove the nonlawyer MDP option and focus solely on MDPs that lie within the control
of practicing attorneys.
E.

MDP

COMMISSION IS PREDISPOSED AGAINST NONLAWYERCONTROLLED

MDPs

A final point is that dismissing nonlawyer-controlled MDPs should not
be a very difficult pill for the MDP Commission to swallow. Throughout
its proposal, it is very clear that although nonlawyer-controlled MDPs are
allowed, they are held on a very tight leash. The professional audit required of such MDPs may have the practical effect of discouraging their
formation altogether. The Big Five have expressed their disdain for the
strict application of such procedures and it is likely that they will simply
proceed with their present approach of network development rather than
tangle with the ethical audit procedures suggested in the Commission's
Proposal. If these strict requirements for nonlawyer-MDPs are any indication of such an intent, it should not be difficult for the Commission to
take the next step and outlaw their formation in an outright fashion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The time for Multidisciplinary Practices has arrived in America. The
practical and economic convenience of "one stop shopping" has reached
professional services, and the only questions that remain revolve around
"how" rather than "if." The ABA's MDP Commission has developed a
Proposal to amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, repeal the
present ban on fee-sharing with nonlawyers, and allow for MDP formation, but it has done so in a reckless manner. The Commission's proposal
is an unrealistic vision of MDPs that ignores the ethical, practical, and
political difficulties of allowing MDPs to form under nonlawyer control.
MDPs will undeniably benefit the American legal profession, but must be
welcomed with careful attention and great caution. Professional combinations that remain under the control and direction of practicing attorneys retain the necessary ethical standards of the legal profession and
allow for the proper development of the MDP format. If any advancement within the legal community is to occur, the MDP Commission
should amend its Proposal-denying nonlawyer-controlled MDPs the opportunity to gain a foothold and allowing lawyer-controlled MDPs to become the standard.
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